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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the association between institutional ownership structures and the quality 
of earnings information via changes in earnings response coefficients for a sample of Japanese 
firms during 1990-1998. From these results we can predict that the greater the percentage of 
institutional shareholders in Japan, the better the quality of earnings information and the higher 
the foreign ownership; the quality of earnings information is better during Japan’s recession 
period of 1990-1998.  However, keiretsu membership percentage is not important for the quality 
of earnings information in Japan even though firm size, leverage ratio, and growth are important 
factors in earnings information in Japan.  
 
Keywords:  institutional ownership, quality of earnings information, earnings response coefficient, foreign 
ownership 
 
Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
apan is a unique country in terms of business and capital market practices.  After the stock market crash of 
1991, the Japanese capital market claimed to follow the western model and their banking and accounting 
rules followed those of OECD countries.  However, there are still some major differences such as keiretsu, 
main bank, direct involvement of owners and founders, and foreign ownership structures.  Some of these corporate 
governance structures in Japan are thought of as useful mechanisms to diversify business risks and are followed by 
other Asian countries such as South Korean chaebol or business groups.  However, the Samsung group is now being 
accused of reserving huge amounts of private funds for the Lee family’s personal use and, as of today, the 
government is starting to investigate those funds.  
 
 The purpose of this paper is to exam these institutional ownership structures in Japan, which contributed to 
corporate governance after the market crash of 1991.  The first unique structure of corporate governance in Japan is 
a ‘keiretsu’ system.  Based on prior studies, corporate governance issues had two conflicting theories.  Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) propose higher convergence of interests of ownership and managers while Stultz (1988) proposes 
less convergence of managerial ownership and owners’ interests.  However, it is an empirical question to be tested.  
In addition, Johnston (1995) suggests Japanese managers have non-myopic strategies and policies.  However, all of 
these assertions may change after the market crash.  This paper tests empirically the quality of earnings information 
via the earning response coefficient (ERC) measure using Japanese data after the market crash.  Our paper is 
organized as follows: the next section reviews the background and develops hypotheses, the third section discusses 
research methodology, and the last section presents findings and conclusions. 
 
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Keiretsu or business grouping is a unique system in Japan.  Chaebols in South Korea or business groups in 
Hong Kong or China are close examples among Asian countries.  By cross-sharing vertically by product suppliers or 
distributors or cross-sharing horizontally financially, they assume to diversify business risk or share information 
J 
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within keiretsu firms.  This system will protect interests of managers or owners within groups, but from outside 
investors’ points of views, the keiretsu firm’s financial information may not be easy to interpret or understand.  
Prowse (1992) cannot find any significant relationship between keiretsu firms and independent firm performances 
using 1984 Japanese data.  In addition, Jameson et al. (2000) find that keiretsu firms are less effective at shareholder 
wealth maximization either in horizontal or vertical keiretsu firms using 1985-1989 data.  However, Ferris et al. 
(1995) find that keiretsu firms are more effective in controlling conflicts of interests under the agency context using 
1990 Japanese data.  Since there are mixed results in previous studies, it warrants testing using more current data.  In 
addition, we measure the issue as the quality of earnings information for investors using the earnings response 
coefficient.  Therefore, our first hypothesis in an alternative form is as follows: 
 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, the quality of earnings information is higher for keiretsu firms compared with non-keiretsu 
firms.   
 
 Usually, there is a main bank within the keiretsu firms and the main bank acts as the monitoring and control 
agent in the Japanese capital market.  The main bank system shares information between the bank and the firm.  In 
the Japanese system, the main bank and other financial institutions incorporate a voluntary disclosure mechanism on 
the part of managers (Sheard, 1989).  Gedajlovic et al. (2003) find empirically that financial institutions in Japan act 
as effective monitors using 1986-1991 data.  However, Morck and Nakamura (1999) find that banks’ and other 
financial institutions’ monitoring is not perfect using 383 manufacturing firms during 1981-87.  They propose that 
bankers appointed to firms’ boards after poor performances appear to be a response to poor liquidity issues.  Morck 
et al. (2000) propose that Japanese financial institutions are also equity holders and takeovers are rare in Japan.  
They also find that managerial ownership and firm value is positive in Japan.  Hoshi et al. (1990) propose a similar 
view that main banks and other insurance companies hold a majority of debt and equities in Japan.  They share 
information between firm and creditors.  Therefore, even though Japanese firms have higher debt ratios, they do not 
show a negative relation between leverage ratios and conflicts of interests between shareholders and debt-holders 
(Prowse, 1990).  Prior to 1990, the two largest institutional shareholders in Japan were banks and life insurance 
companies.  However, this may change after the market crash.  Jennings (2005) posits that institutional investors are 
key information collectors, and usually large enough to influence managers’ strategic decisions, but they may be 
myopic, have a lack of expertise, and have agency problems.  Sandra et al. (2001) test the quality of earnings 
information and level of institutional holdings and find that there is a positive relationship between institutional 
holdings and earnings information, but their data is from 1995.  We aggregated financial institutions due to our data 
limitations and this may be more appropriate in Japanese studies as they may have cross-sharings, as they did in 
Pushner’s (1995) study.  Therefore, our second hypothesis in an alternative form is as follows: 
 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and the quality of earnings 
information in Japanese firms. 
 
Foreign investors in Japanese firms may have different motivations than domestic institutional investors.  
Hiraki et al. (2003) find that foreign investors in Japan are more export-oriented.  In other words, foreign investors 
allocate more investments to familiar firms.  Ferris and Park (2005) find similar results that foreign investors 
allocate their funds in well-performing firms.  Jiang and Kim (2004) posit that foreign investors prefer equity shares 
of firms with low information asymmetry and find that foreign institutional investors in Japan from 1976 to 1994 are 
investing more in low information asymmetry firms.  Similarly, Chung and Lee (1998) find that foreign investors 
trade more on current information and react more on earnings announcements.  Based on previous conjectures we 
developed the third hypothesis in an alternative form as follows: 
 
H3:  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between foreign ownership and the quality of earnings 
information in Japanese firms. 
 
Previous studies in this context of earnings quality and ownership structures used size, risk, debt, growth, 
and persistence as control variables (see Jung and Kwon, 2002, for an example).  Watts and Zimmerman (1990) 
posit that large corporations are more politically sensitive than smaller firms.  Jensen et al. (1992) also use size, risk, 
the number of divisions, and research and development expenditures in their study.  The Japanese use large business 
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groups and trading partners to spread over risk factors (Fitzgerald, 2000).  Therefore, risk should be controlled.  In 
addition, in Japan, large debt holders are also large equity holders and their equity trading is not active (Pushner, 
1995).  Therefore, the debt or leverage ratios should be controlled.  The Japanese usually emphasize growth in sales 
and market share rather than earnings and growth controlled in a similar study (Hermann et al., 2003).  Earnings 
persistence may be different in Japan compared with the U.S. (Hermann et al., 2000).  Therefore, we control growth 
and persistence in our study.  With all control variables, our model is as follows: 
 
 Ri = b0 + b1Ei/Pit-1 + b2INSTi x Ei/Pit-1 + b3KEIRETSUi x Ei/Pit-1 + b4FOREIGNi x Ei/Pit-1 + b5SIZEit + 
b6RISKit + b7DEBTit + b8GROWTHit +b9PERSISTit+ b10YEARit + ei 
 
where Ri = stock return of firm i for the 12-month period to the year-end, calculated as (Pit -Pit-1 + Dit)/Pit-1.  Pit is the 
stock price of firm i at t and Dit is the dividend of firm i at t: Ei = earnings per share before extraordinary item of 
firm i; INSTi = top five institutional owners in Japan Company Handbook (JCH) including main banks and 
insurance companies; KEIRETSUi = keiretsu firms vs. non-keiretsu firms as a dummy variable; FOREIGNi = 
foreign ownership in percent; SIZEi = firm size calculated using logarithm of total sales; RISKi = risk of the firm 
using market beta; DEBTi = leverage ratio calculated as total debt divided by total assets; GROWTHi = growth 
measured by market value of equity divided by book value of equity; PERSISTi = persistence of earnings calculated 
by the autocorrelation of earnings during 1990-1998; and YEARi = year dummy variable during the test period. 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA DESCRIPTIONS 
 
 The original sample consists of all March 31 fiscal year-end Japanese firms that are included in the 2000 
PACAP database of Japan compiled by the Pacific-Basin Capital Market (PACAP) Research Center at the 
University of Rhode Island.  From these firms, we exclude firms whose ownership data are unavailable from the 
JCH and whose financial and stock return data are missing from the PACAP database.  Keiretsu classification is 
used as an indicator variable representing the presence of inter-keiretsu ownership held by the other institutions 
within the keiretsu if the sample firm belonged to one of six keiretsu groups. The big six groups include the Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi Kangyo (Miyashita and Russell, 1994). Foreign ownership 
(FOREIGN) is measured by the percentage of ownership held by foreign institutional shareholders.  We end up with 
a total of 9,560 firm-year observations.  The lowest number of firm-year observations was 1,008 in 1990 and the 
highest number was 1,089 in 1997. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Table 1, Panel A reports distribution of ownership percentage by relevant owners.  Foreign ownership in 
Japan was 4.65% in 1990, but it was 8.13% in 1998.  During this test period, foreign ownership percentages 
increased each year.  Institutional ownership percentage of the top five major shareholders from JCH was 16.03% in 
1990, but it was 14.93% in 1998.  This ratio decreased over time through 1998.  Keiretsu ownership percentage 
shows the proportion of keiretsu firms analyzed in our study; it was 15% in 1990, but only 13% in 1998.  During 
this time, the Japanese capital market appears to follow the western capital market model. 
 
 Table 1, Panel B presents mean, median, and standard error of ownership percentage.  The average (median) 
value of foreign ownership was 6.05% (3.50%), top five institutional ownership was 15.12% (14.80%), and keiretsu 
ownership was 0.14% (0.00%).  We examined the Person correlation of our study variables and EP and EP x 
FOREIGN are 0.4884 and SIZE and EP x KEIRETSU are 0.3403.  Other variables are not highly correlated and not 
reported here. 
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Table 1 
Panel A:  Distribution of ownership percentage by relevant owners  
 
 Foreign ownership Institutional ownership Keiretsu ownership* Number of observations 
1990 4.65 16.03 0.15 1008 
1991 4.29 15.39 0.14 1035 
1992 4.77 14.64 0.14 1065 
1993 5.06 15.43 0.14 1073 
1994 5.32 15.40 0.13 1079 
1995 6.38 15.08 0.13 1077 
1996 7.07 14.95 0.13 1077 
1997 8.16 14.52 0.13 1089 
1998 8.13 14.93 0.13 1057 
Total    9560 
*: the proportion of keiretsu firms analyzed 
 
Panel B:  Descriptive statistics of ownership by relevant owners 
 
Variable Mean Median Std Error Minimum Maximum N 
Foreign ownership 6.05 3.50 0.08 0.00 77.80 9560 
Institutional ownership 15.12 14.80 0.08 0.20 343.00 9560 
Keiretsu ownership 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 9560 
 
 
 Table 2 reports overall firm stock returns on distinct interaction terms.  EP is positive and significant at the 
1% significance level.  This shows that earnings have significant relations with stock returns.  Our model is 
significant with adjusted R
2
 value of 35.89%.  The Wald Chi-square test is also performed since keiretsu ownership 
variable use 0 and 1 dichotomous value and median value was 0 as reported in Table 1, Panel B, but the overall 
model is significant.  EP x INST is positive and significant.  This suggests that the greater the percentage of holdings 
of institutional shareholders, the more informative the earnings.  EP x FOREIGN is also positive and significant.  
This shows that foreign shareholders in Japan during their recession period have a positive influence on earnings 
information.  However, EP x KEIRETSU is positive, but marginally significant.  This result indicates that keiretsu 
membership has a marginal impact on earnings information.  The year dummy variable is included and each year is 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 2: Regression of stock returns on distinct interaction terms 
 
 Coefficients t-value 
EP 0.6647 17.71*** 
EP×INST 0.1799 2.73*** 
EP×KEIRETSU 0.1472 1.89* 
EP×FOREIGN 0.4849 8.79*** 
INTERCEPT -0.2044 -39.85*** 
YEAR  
DUMMIES* 
(1991-1998) 
Included - 
Adj-R2 0.3589 
Wald Chisq 10204.61*** 
N 9560 
Model: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedasticity and AR(1) Correction 
*: Year 1990 is excluded as base year.  Each year dummy variable is significantly different from zero and not reported here. 
 
***: the 1% of significance level 
**  : the 5% of significance level 
*    : the10% of significance level. 
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 Collins et al. (1999) report that if earnings are negative, the quality of earnings information may not be the 
same.  Therefore, we split our sample into a positive EP group and negative EP group and the results are reported in 
Table 3.  We lose some data points because of the extreme value of EP in this process.  When EP is positive our 
results are consistent with the results in Table 2.  Even the EP x KEIRETSU variable is significant at the 5% level.  
However, when EP is negative, the EP x INST variable is not significant.  The EP x KEIRETSU variable is negative 
and significant.  This result implies that when earnings are negative, the greater percentage of keiretsu membership 
of owners, the less the quality of earnings information.  The models are still significant when either EP is positive 
(adjusted R
2
 of 39.90%) or EP is negative (adjusted R
2
 of 32.98%). 
 
 
Table 3: Regression of stock returns on distinct interaction term by EP size 
 
 EP>=0 EP <0 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
EP 0.8494 16.36*** -0.0127 -0.18 
EP×INST 0.1453 2.09** 0.0202 1.26 
EP×KEIRETSU 0.1728 2.17** -1.2898 -3.49*** 
EP×FOREIGN 0.4276 7.32*** 0.0389 2.45** 
INTERCEPT -0.2084 -40.80*** -0.2274 -13.70*** 
YEAR DUMMIES* 
(1991-1998) 
Included  Included  
Adj-R2 0.3990 0.3298 
Wald Chisq 9638.12*** 5790.18*** 
N 8729 812 
Model: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedasticity and AR(1) Correction 
*: Year 1990 is excluded as base year. Each year dummy variable is significantly different from zero and not reported here.  
However, when EP < 0, 1998 is not significant. 
 
***: the 1% of significance level 
**  : the 5% of significance level 
*    : the10% of significance level. 
 
 
Table 4 presents full sample regression of stock returns with total control variables.  The model is 
significant with adjusted R
2
 of 37.64% (Wald Chi-square test of 11707.95).  EP is significant and positive as 
expected.  EP x INST is positive and significant at the 5% level.  Therefore, we reject the H2 null hypothesis.  This 
result indicates that the greater institutional shareholders in Japan, the better the quality of earnings information.  EP 
x FOREIGN is positive and significant at the 1% level.  Thus, we reject the H3 null hypothesis.  This result shows 
that the higher the foreign ownership in Japan, the better the quality of earnings information.  Ferris and Park (2005) 
find similar results.  However, EP x KEIRETSU is not significant.  Therefore, we cannot reject the H1 null 
hypothesis. This result shows that keiretsu membership percentage and the quality of earnings information are not 
related.  Prowse (1992) finds similar results using earlier data.  SIZE is positive and significant.  It is interesting that 
earnings are more informative as the firm size increases in Japan. Japanese firms may focus on their long-term 
reputations rather than short-term earnings. DEBT is negative and significant.  The higher the leverage ratios, the 
less informative earnings are informative in Japan. GROWTH is positive and significant as expected.  However, 
RISK and PERSIST are negative and not significant in Japan. 
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Table 4: Regression of stock returns on full regressors 
 
 Coefficients t-value 
EP 0.7340 20.17*** 
EP×INST 0.1309 2.11** 
EP×KEIRETSU 0.1076 1.40 
EP×FOREIGN 0.1851 3.39*** 
SIZE 0.0211 15.99*** 
RISK -3.83e-06 -1.48 
DEBT -0.2187 -24.88*** 
GROWTH 0.0000169 20.10*** 
PERSIST -0.0047 -0.41 
INTERCEPT -0.3739 -23.61*** 
YEAR DUMMIES* 
(1991-1998) 
Included - 
Adj-R2 0.3764 
Wald Chisq 11707.95*** 
N 9560 
Model: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedasticity and AR(1) Correction 
*: Year 1990 is excluded as base year. Each year dummy variable is significantly different from zero and not reported here. 
***: the 1% of significance level 
**  : the 5% of significance level 
*    : the10% of significance level. 
 
Table 5 reports the full regression with all control variables by EP size.  When EP is positive, only EP x 
KEIRETSU is marginally significant.  However, SIZE, DEBT, GROWTH, PERSIST are significant.  In 1996, the 
model is not significant.  When EP is negative, EP x KEIRETUS is negative and marginally significant.  EP x 
FOREIGN is positive and significant.  DEBT, GROWTH, and PERSIST are significant.  Again in 1998, the model 
is not significant.   
 
Table 5: Regression of stock returns on full regressors by EP size 
 
 EP>=0 EP <0 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
EP 1.3309 24.87*** -0.0488 -0.68 
EP×INST 0.0774 1.19 0.1649 0.96 
EP×KEIRETSU 0.1319 1.65* -0.6151 -1.87* 
EP×FOREIGN -0.0473 -0.81 0.5853 3.58*** 
SIZE 0.0242 17.00*** -0.0002 -0.06 
RISK 0.0000 -0.37 0.0000 -1.35 
DEBT -0.3035 -29.85*** -0.0891 -4.59*** 
GROWTH 0.0000 28.24*** 0.0000 3.82*** 
PERSIST -0.0303 -2.53** 0.1150 4.74*** 
INTERCEPT -0.4486 -26.09*** -0.1583 -3.44*** 
YEAR DUMMIES* 
(1991-1998) 
Included  Included  
Adj-R2 0.4497 0.3527 
Wald Chisq 11890.33*** 2681.12*** 
N 8683 808 
Model: Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression with heteroskedasticity and AR(1) Correction 
*: Year 1990 is excluded as base year. Each year dummy variable is significantly different from zero and not reported here.  
However, when EP >= 0, 1996 is not significant whereas 1998 is not significant when EP < 0. 
***: the 1% of significance level 
**  : the 5% of significance level 
*    : the10% of significance level. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study tested empirically the relationship between the quality of earnings and ownership structure in 
Japan.  From the results of distinct interaction terms, all variables are significant except EP x KEIRETSU is 
marginally significant.  However, when EP is negative, EP x INST is not significant.  When we include all control 
variables with the full sample, EP x KEIRETSU is not significant.  This finding is consistent with previous studies 
such as Prowse (1992).  In addition, RISK and PERSIST are not significant.  If we divide this by EP size with full 
control variables, the results are not consistent.  Only DEBT, GROWTH, and PERSIST are significant.  From the 
overall sample with full control variable results, EP x INST and EP x FOREIGN are positive and significant.  From 
these results we can predict that the greater the percentage of top five institutional shareholders in Japan, the better 
the quality of earnings information and the higher the foreign ownership, the quality of earnings information is 
better during their recession period of 1990-1998.  However, keiretsu membership percentage is not important for 
the quality of earnings information in Japan even though, firm size, leverage ratio, and growth are important factors 
in earnings information in Japan.  
 
The limitation of our study is that we used a small portion of the test period and cannot extend our findings 
into another time period.  When EP is negative, the sample size is small and the results are not stable.  However, we 
try to understand the quality of earnings information in Japan during their recessionary period after the market crash 
and after their real estate value declined significantly.  This may help us to understand the U.S. situation we are 
facing from the sub-prime mortgage crisis. 
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